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Burk and Booth: Income Tax: Deductibility of Penalty Payments as Business Expense
CASE COMMENTS
for the maximum period, so that the Commission would have jurisdiction instead of the Court. This procedure would overlook the
fact that in such situations a part of the probationary period would
probably elapse without the Commission having actual supervision.
Since it is unlawful to suspend indefinitely the imposition of sentence, an attempt to do so should be treated as placing the defendant
on probation under the supervision of the Parole Commission. The
convicted defendant has a right either to immediate sentence or to
Parole Commission supervision. Suspension should be treated as an
election not to sentence, thus leaving the other alternative. Even
though under the "relation back" rule enunciated in the Bateh case
the defendant would have to serve only the remainder of his sentence, to allow this procedure would permit the trial court to do indirectly what it may not do directly. It is true that the other alternative would leave the defendant on probation without supervision, but
he should not be prejudiced by the faulty procedure of the court.
The Parole Commission could undertake supervision for the remainder of the maximum period once it is apprised of the fact of
the defendant's probation.
The Court, however, says by way of dictum that the trial court
does not lose jurisdiction until the maximum period has passed.
This statement was not necessary for the decision of the case and
should be revoked at the Court's earliest opportunity.
ToM E. BnPD

INCOME TAX: DEDUCTIBILITY OF PENALTY PAYMENTS
AS BUSINESS EXPENSES
Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,78 Sup. Ct. 507 (1958)
In 1951 Tank Truck Rentals, petitioner, paid fines amounting to
$41,060.84 for violations of the vehicle maximum weight laws of six
states.' The offenses were in part willful, in part innocent. Petitioner
claimed a deduction from gross income under section 23 (a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 19392 for the amount paid. The Tax
'Del., Md., N.J., Ohio, Pa., and W. Va. See 78 Sup. Ct. at 508 for a list of the

statutes violated.
253 STAT. 12, now

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §162 (a): "In computing net income
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Court 3 and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 4 upheld the
Commissioner's disallowance of the deduction. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari. s HELD, to allow a deduction for fines exacted under
a state statute would be to frustrate clearly defined state policy.
Judgment affirmed.
The Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction from gross income
of all the ordinary and necessary expenses of any trade or business. 6
Ordinary expenses have been defined as "normal, usual and customary"
expenditures, arising out of transactions that are "of common or frequent occurrence in the type of business involved." 7 An expense is
necessary if it is appropriate and helpful to8 or proximately results
from" the taxpayer's business. To be deductible an expense must be
both ordinary and necessary.' 0
The broad statutory test of deductibility"l has been narrowed by
court decision to exclude expenditures that violate, or arise from
transactions that violate, public policy.' 2 Bribes and protection payments,

13

lobbying fees, 1 4 and litigation expenses' s incurred in the un-

successful defense of criminal actions have been held nondeductible for
reasons of public policy. However, the cases have developed certain
there shall be allowed as deductions . . . all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.
326 T.C. 427 (1956).
4242 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1957).
5354 U.S. 920 (1957).
6See note 2 supra.
7Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 93 (1952).
8Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
9Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928); Appeal of Backer, 1 B.T.A.
214 (1924).
1ODeputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
"In Alexandria Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 95 F.2d 615, 616 (5th Cir. 1938),
the court said: "The provisions of the statute fixing the deductions to be regarded
in arriving at the net income which alone is taxed . . . are as broad and unqualified
as those defining the taxable gross income."
12 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943); National Brass Works
v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 526, 530 (9th Cir. 1950); see Schwartz, Business Expenses
Contrary to Public Policy, 8 TAX L. REv. 241 (1953).
13Charles A. Clark, 19 T.C. 48 (1952); Appeal of Frank A. Maddas, 40 B.T.A. 572
(1939), aff'd, 114 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1940).
'4Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941); Cammarano v. United States, 246 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1957); T.D. 4626, XV-1 Cums. BULL.
61 (1936).
-3Burroughs Bldg. Materials Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931); C.
W. Thomas, 16 T.C. 1417 (1951); Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T.C. 801 (1947).
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limitations on the utilization of the public policy concept to disallow
deductions. (1) There must be a sharply defined policy evidenced by
a governmental declaration-8 proscribing the conduct involved."7 (2)
The expenditure sought to be deducted must bear more than a remote
connection to the conduct proscribed?18 (3) The allowance of a deduction must result in severe and immediate frustration of the particular public policy offended.- 9
In the absence of considerations of public policy, the fines paid
by the petitioner in the instant case would qualify for a deduction
under the code. The Supreme Court acknowledged the commercial
impossibility of operating the petitioner's trucks with less than maximum loads and the uniqueness of the Pennsylvania law, the willful
violation of which was an inescapable part of the petitioner's continued operation.2 0 But the Court held: "A finding of 'necessity' cannot be made.., if allowance of the deduction would frustrate sharply
defined national or state policies .... "2' Tank Truck Rentals took
a calculated risk in operating its trucks at an overload. To allow
the deduction sought would but "encourage continued violation of
state law by increasing the odds in favors of non-compliance." 22 The
Court refused to distinguish fines incurred willfully from those occasioned by inadvertence, since the state maximum weight laws made
no such distinction. Cases allowing deduction for the expenses of
innocent violations of the Emergency Price Control Act of 194223
were held inapplicable. The Price Administrator, in applying that
act, had differentiated between willful and innocent violators24
Prior to 1951 the Commissioner allowed truckers to deduct overweight fines as tolls necessary to the operation of the industry.2 5 This
policy was consistent with the Internal Revenue Service practice of
16Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 97 (1952), 6 U. FLA. L. REv. 136 (1953).
17Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943), 57 HARV. L. REv. 109 (1943),
42 MicH. L. REV. 1143 (1944).
IsCommissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 474 (1943).
19Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1949), 59

L.J. 561 (1950).
2OAt 508.

YALE

2lAt 509.
22At 510.
23E.g., Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943); Jerry Rossman Corp.
v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
24
See I.T. 3762, Cum. BuLL. 95 (1945); I.T. 3627, CuM. BuLL. 111 (1943).
25I.T.: P:2-WVTL, 5 C CH STAND. FED. TAX. RElP. No. 6134; see Wilbur Howard
McCormack, P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. No. 56,216.
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allowing deductions for damages paid to private parties in common
law actions2 6 and under regulatory statutes 27 as ordinary and necessary
business expenses. Such expenditures have been excluded from the
operation of the public policy doctrine because they are "remedial"
28
rather than "penal" in character.
In contrast to the Service's policy regarding damages and fines paid
under regulatory statutes to private parties, fines and penalties paid
to governmental agencies for violation of federal2 9 and state "0 statutes
are not deductible. Deduction is disallowed either on the ground that
such expenditures are avoidable and therefore not a necessary incident to the operation of a business-' or that, because of public
policy, they ought not to receive tax sanctions. 32 The Court's decision
in the instant case and in the companion case of Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Commissioner33 is in accord with the Service's present
policy of disallowing a deduction for amounts paid as fines for violations of state maximum weight laws.3 4
The Commissioner and the courts in applying the public policy
doctrine to penalties are on firm ground. However, problems remain
in this and related areas of illegal expenses.3 5 What sort of govern26E.g., Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935) (fraud); International
Shoe Co., 38 B.T.A. 81 (1938), acquiesced, 1938-2 CuM. BULL. 17 (conspiracy in
restraint of trade).
27See Appeal of Huff, Andrews & Thomas, 1 B.T.A. 542 (1925); I.T. 3762, 1945
CuM. BULL. 95; I.T. 3627, 1943 CUM. BULL. 111; I.T. 3412, 1940-2 Cum. BULL. 176.
28I.T. 3762, 1945 Cum. BULL. 95; see 59 YALE L.J. 561, 562, n.4.
29United States v. Jaffray, 97 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1938) (tax penalty); Great
Northern Ry. v. Commissioner, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 855
(1930) (Hours of Service Law, Safety Appliance Act, Transportation of Livestock
Law, Quarantine Law); Bonnie Bros. v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 1231 (1929)
(Volstead Act).
30Commissioner v. Loghorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1945)
(state anti-trust law); Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d
178 (2d Cir. 1931) (state anti-trust law); Fred D. Newman, P-H 1955 T.C. Mem.
Dec. No. 52,267 (1952) (liquor regulation).
31E.g., Gallatin Farmer Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1942);
National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878 (2d Cir.
1937); Appeal of Columbus Bread Co., 4 B.T.A. 1126 (1926).
32National Brass Works v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1950); Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., supra note 30; United States v.
Jaffray, supra note 29; Davenshire, Inc., 12 T.C. 958 (1949).
3378 Sup. Ct. 511 (1958).
341.T. 4042, 1951-1 CUM. BULL. 15.
35See Paul, The Use of Public Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowing Deductions, U. So. CAL. 1954 TAX INST. 715; Notes, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 1344 (1931);
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